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Do analysts overreact to extreme good news in earnings?

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Abstract

We provide an alternative explanation for the previous finding of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings. We show that such finding could be a result of analysts’ rational behavior in the face of high earnings uncertainty rather than their cognitive bias. Extreme earnings performance tends to be associated with higher earnings uncertainty that generally leads to more forecast optimism. Once this effect is accounted for, the univariate result of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings is subsumed, leaving only their underreaction in general.

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Notes

  1. One may also interpret this result as analysts’ overreaction in the sense that they overestimate the mean reversion of earnings changes and forecast too high (low) following bad (good) news. It is not our point to argue over the labeling of underreaction or overreaction. We follow the Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) definition of under-/overreaction throughout the paper.

  2. An exception is Machuga et al. (2002) who find that analyst forecast errors are negatively correlated with past economic value added.

  3. As discussed earlier, there have been behavioral models to explain investors’ under- or overreaction (e.g., Barberis et al. 1998; Daniel et al. 1999; Hong and Stein 1999). Whether these models are applicable to analysts depends on whether there is any evidence of analysts’ under- or overreaction.

  4. Lim (2001) examines variables such as firm size, analyst following and poor performance and attributes their effect on forecast bias to earnings uncertainty. Although these variables are correlated with earnings uncertainty, forecast dispersion is a more direct measure of uncertainty itself. We also consider many of the variables in Lim (2001) and find that they have their own effects after forecast dispersion is controlled for, possibly for reasons other than earnings uncertainty. Moreover, a major point of our paper is that earnings uncertainty is higher for both poor and superior performance rather than only for poor performance as in Lim (2001).

  5. The forecasts used by Eastwood and Nutt (1999) appear to be the consensus forecasts that were made 8 months prior to the fiscal year-end from the summary file of IBES, which actually may contain stale forecasts made before information about previous year’s earnings is known (Brown and Han 1992).

  6. We also use an alternative earnings levels measure, i.e., the most recent realized earnings EPS t−1, and discuss the results in additional analysis. Both Ali et al. (1992) and Butler and Saraoglu (1999) examine simple categories such as losses. We allow continuous changes in earnings levels and find that forecast errors behave differently within different segments of earnings levels. Some other studies use ex post realized earnings EPS t as the earnings levels measure, which is subject to a look-ahead bias (e.g., Eames and Glover 2003).

  7. Using prior annual rather than quarterly earnings to measure MNMD produces qualitatively similar results but significantly reduces the number of available observations.

  8. Other ways of identifying outliers, such as winsorizing or deleting a certain percentage of extreme observations, require the knowledge of the overall cross-sectional distribution that may not yet be available. We follow the 100% cutoff point rule in Eastwood and Nutt (1999) but do not remove observations with forecast errors greater than 100% using ex post earnings realizations. We only use ex ante information so that any forecast inefficiency is identifiable and improvable when the forecasts are made.

  9. Brown (2001) documents a strong increasing trend in median forecast errors possibly because he uses a different data source (IBES), examines the single most recent quarterly forecasts rather than consensus annual forecasts, and measures forecast errors in dollar terms rather than percentages.

  10. The number of observations in 1999 is smaller because 1999 was a partial year when the data were made available to us.

  11. If we use the larger sample only with FE t and F t available, the slope for the upper quartile is negative and significant at less than 10% level, suggesting some overreaction to extreme good news in F t . The disappearance of significance in Table 2 indicates that the overreaction effect for F t is not robust to sampling variations.

  12. Graphically, after the effects on forecast optimism of high earnings uncertainty are taken away, the forecast error lines in Fig. 1 are lifted upward at both ends. At the high end, the downward slope for ΔEPS t−1 now becomes flat, and the flat slope for F t becomes steeper. At the low end, the upward slopes become less steep for ΔEPS t−1 and even downward for F t .

  13. For the upper quarter of F t , the mean FE t is −1.33% and the mean DISP t is 3.56%. Thus, the average FE t after the uncertainty-induced bias is taken away is roughly −1.33% − (−0.34) × 3.56% = −0.12%.

  14. Another possibility for the reversal of coefficient signs for the lower quartile is that DISP t is not linearly related to forecast errors. A linear specification may over or under-compensate the dispersion-caused bias when DISP t is high. This could affect the signs at the extremes of earnings levels due to the high correlation to DISP t (see Fig. 1). Barring a theory to functionally link forecast dispersions to forecast bias, it is not clear which functional form is appropriate. When we try the square root of, logarithm of, segmented, and squared DISP t , β L  + β LL remains negative.

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Acknowledgments

Helpful comments by an anonymous referee, Mingyi Hung, Prem Jain and participants of the Chinese Accounting Professors Association Annual Meeting at Southwest University of Finance and Economics are gratefully acknowledged. We thank First Call for providing analyst forecast data.

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Correspondence to Zhaoyang Gu.

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Gu, Z., Xue, J. Do analysts overreact to extreme good news in earnings?. Rev Quant Finan Acc 29, 415–431 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-007-0037-8

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